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The Social Meaning of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
Linda Sugin 
abstract.  This Essay exposes the moral messages implicit in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA). It argues that the legislation reﬂects values that were not openly debated or discussed in 
the legislative process, but are crucial to the distributional effects of the law. The TCJA reduces 
progressivity and increases deﬁcits because it favors traditional families, prefers capital to labor 
income, treats people as detached from each other, makes charity the narrow concern of the rich, 
and privileges the acquisition of assets. Fairness in taxation depends on explicitly identifying social 
values that produce economic justice and purposely designing the law to achieve fairness. 
introduction  
A nation’s tax law reﬂects its values, and tax reform is an important moment 
to examine how the tax law deﬁnes national priorities. The changes Congress 
made to the Internal Revenue Code in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)1 
reveal ideals beyond those Congress explicitly identiﬁed and defended in the leg-
islative process. While scholarly discussion of the proposed legislation focused 
primarily on efficiency concerns,2 a wide range of social policies became embed-
ded in the economic structure the tax law creates. Whether policy makers con-
sciously created social policy based on these values is less important. Identifying 
these values, though, is crucial, as the resultant policies will affect all Americans 
in myriad ways. 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
2. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Economic Effects of the Corporate Tax Rate Reduction, 158 TAX NOTES 
1393, 1400 n.17 (2018) (focusing on the efficiency gains of the corporate rate cut); see also JANE 
G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44823, THE “BETTER WAY” HOUSE TAX PLAN: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2, 6-7 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44823.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BGW9-GEYZ] (discussing efficiency as an objective of tax reform in terms of the alloca-
tion of capital and the equal treatment of investment). 
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This Essay discusses ﬁve American priorities and values revealed by the 
TCJA: 
1.  The traditional family is best; 
2. Individuals have greater entitlement to their capital than to their la-
bor; 
3.  People are autonomous individuals; 
4.  Charity is for the rich; and 
5.  Physical things are important. 
The TCJA’s distributional effects dovetail with these values. As has been 
widely reported, the legislation substantially reduces the tax obligation of the 
most affluent Americans and reduces taxes only slightly and temporarily for the 
least affluent.3 Reducing the progressivity of the tax system and diminishing to-
tal revenue collected is consistent with implementing these ﬁve priorities and 
values. First, traditional families with a single working spouse and a stay-at-
home spouse are disproportionately prosperous, so subsidizing that family 
model reduces progressivity. Second, access to capital increases with affluence, 
so a greater entitlement to investment income favors taxpayers who enjoy that 
affluence. Third, valuing individual autonomy is consistent with robust individ-
ual property rights, and less consistent with high levels of taxation for shared 
community purposes. Fourth, favoring the charitable giving of the rich allows 
them tax reductions not available to others, and sends the message that philan-
thropy substitutes for tax paid. Fifth, prioritizing physical assets favors individ-
uals are able to invest in such assets and underrates the important value that 
workers contribute to prosperity. 
Critics of the legislation concerned about the law’s reallocation of tax burdens 
down the income scale4 and its projected budgetary deﬁcits5 must focus more on 
 
3. See William Gale, Surachai Khitatrakun & Aaron Krupkin, Winners and Losers After Paying for 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX POL’Y CTR. 11 (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter
.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publication/150211/winners_and_losers_after_paying_for_the_tax 
_cuts_and_jobs_act_12.8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK34-KWEK]. 
4. See, e.g., David Cole, Taxing the Poor, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (May 10, 2018) https://www.nybooks
.com/articles/2018/05/10/taxing-the-poor [https://perma.cc/A7YY-HACD] (arguing that 
the TCJA will hasten the collapse of the middle class and thus destroy American constitutional 
government); see also Patrick Driessen, Tracing the TCJA’s Radical Regressivity, 158 TAX NOTES 
1069, 1069 (2018) (offering a closer look at the distributional analyses used during the con-
gressional deliberation of the TCJA and how such presentations resulted in one of the “most 
distributionally lopsided, broad U.S. legislative enactments ever”). 
5. See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets via Degraded Tax Policy Process, 
HILL (Dec. 4, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/ﬁnance/363096-senators-picked
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these embedded priorities. The distributional effects ﬂow from these principles, 
not vice versa. The ultimate fairness of the tax system depends on deliberately 
creating a substructure that reﬂects equality, community, and dignity as core tax 
policy values. Only after lawmakers engage in this fundamental examination will 
tax reform lead to distributive justice. 
This Essay proceeds by examining how each of these ﬁve values is reﬂected 
in the TCJA. For some of the provisions discussed, there are well-known effi-
ciency justiﬁcations for the legislation. I aim here to emphasize that efficiency is 
a value. It deserves no deﬁnitive inﬂuence on policy and is appropriately weighed 
against other values in assessing proposed legislation. While I disagree with 
some of the underlying values reﬂected in the TCJA, this Essay is not intended 
to convince the reader that particular values are best. Instead, its goal is to reveal 
the embedded beliefs that did not receive attention in the process of adopting 
the new law. Only by explicitly considering the social meaning embedded in the 
tax law will policy makers be able to purposely strive for justice in taxation. 
i .  the “traditional family” is  best  
The TCJA made several changes to the way that families are taxed. The tax 
law has long favored families with two parents, one breadwinner, and children 
living in the same home; the TCJA further increased the relative beneﬁts to these 
“traditional” families. The traditional family, in this paradigm, is increasingly 
affluent and white,6 and the tax law normalizes this paradigm further. The TCJA 
increases the tax beneﬁts for traditional families by changing the rate structure, 
stigmatizing head-of-household ﬁling, and modifying the rules concerning tax 
beneﬁts for children. It also reinforces the norm of the traditional family by 
changing the tax treatment of alimony payments. After the TCJA, alimony pay-
ments are subject to more tax than they were before, making it more expensive 
for divorcing spouses. The new rule effectively imposes a new tax on divorce. I 
examine each of these measures below. 
 
-americans-pockets-via-degraded-tax-process [https://perma.cc/7CHT-QU5P] (“[W]hat-
ever virtues the [TCJA] might have are completely swamped by its trillion-dollar plus impact 
on government deﬁcits.”). 
6. Parenting in America: Outlook, Worries, Aspirations Are Strongly Linked to Financial Situation, 
PEW RES. CTR. 1, 6-7 (Dec. 17, 2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/3/2015/12/2015-12-17_parenting-in-america_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2BW 
-TATS] (stating that 72% of white children live with two married parents in contrast to 31% 
of black children, and that only 10% of children living with two married parents live below 
the poverty line, compared with 31% of children living in single-parent households). 
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A. Rates 
The rate structure is somewhat complex in its operation because there are 
different rate schedules for different types of ﬁlers.7 Married people ﬁle a single 
joint return on which they aggregate their income and pay tax on the combined 
amount. Unmarried individuals ﬁle as single taxpayers, or heads of household, 
depending on whether they have dependent children.8 Every ﬁling status has the 
same graduated rates, but the “rate breaks” differ. 
“Rate breaks” are the dollar amounts where higher marginal rates begin. In 
a graduated rate system, all taxpayers enjoy the beneﬁt of lower rates on their 
ﬁrst dollars of income; their highest rate is only applied to their last dollars 
earned. A taxpayer’s “marginal rate” is the rate on her last dollars earned (i.e., at 
the margin). All taxpayers are subject to the same graduated rates, but because 
the rate breaks differ, single taxpayers start to pay tax at higher rates at lower 
income levels than do married taxpayers. For example, in 2018, single individuals 
begin paying tax at 22% on earnings in excess of $38,700, while married ﬁlers 
pay tax at 22% on earnings in excess of $77,400.9 The breaks are lowest for single 
people, higher for heads of household, and highest for married taxpayers ﬁling 
jointly.10 Because married couples ﬁle jointly, the law effectively splits their total 
income between them. But since married people only require a single household, 
the rate breaks for joint ﬁlers are not always double what they are for single ﬁlers. 
At the highest incomes, the breaks for married and single ﬁlers become closer. 
To wit, the 37% bracket begins at $500,000 for single ﬁlers and $600,000 for 
joint ﬁlers.11 At that level of income, the rate structure assumes that married cou-
ples can afford to pay more tax than two single people who each earn half the 
total income.12 
 
7. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-58 (2017) 
(amending I.R.C. § 1 by changing the rate tables for each ﬁling type). 
8. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2018) (deﬁning “head of household” as an individual who is not married at 
the close of the taxable year, is not a surviving spouse, and maintains a household for either a 
qualifying child of the individual or the individual’s parents). 
9. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392, 394-400 (providing tax rate tables). 
10. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11001(a). The 22% rate break does not go into effect until a mar-
ried couple ﬁling jointly earns at least $77,400, whereas the same rate break triggers when a 
head of household earns $51,800, and the single ﬁler makes $38,700. 
11. See id. A head of household must also earn $500,000 before qualifying for the 37% bracket. 
12. Under the TCJA, only the highest income taxpayers are subject to this convergence. Prior to 
2018, this type of convergence started at much lower incomes. For example, two unmarried 
taxpayers who each earned $150,000 in 2017 would have paid less tax than a married couple 
with the same total income. Single taxpayers would have paid $34,981.75 each, for a total of 
$69,963.50, while married ﬁlers would have paid $74,217. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 
I.R.B 707, 709 (providing 2017 tax rate tables). 
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Whether married people pay more or less than they would as single ﬁlers 
depends on the allocation of income earned between them. Where one spouse 
earns all the income, the couple beneﬁts from splitting their income; they receive 
a “marriage bonus” compared to what they would pay if they each paid tax as 
single ﬁlers.13 Where the spouses each earn half of the total joint income, they 
sometimes pay a “marriage penalty” compared to what they would have paid as 
single ﬁlers.14 
The law could eliminate marriage penalties by doubling the rate break for 
married ﬁlers compared to single ﬁlers. But reducing marriage penalties simul-
taneously increases marriage bonuses. Under prior law, only lower-income tax-
payers were protected from marriage penalties15 and guaranteed marriage bo-
nuses in the rate structure, because the rate breaks doubled below the 25% 
marginal rate, covering single taxpayers earning up to $38,700 and joint ﬁlers 
earning up to $77,400.16 That structure makes a lot of sense for lower-income 
taxpayers. At the bottom of the income spectrum, reducing the secondary 
earner’s disincentive to work is an important policy that increases the real dis-
posable income of low-income families. In addition, the earned income tax 
credit, which is available only to low-income taxpayers, contains a severe mar-
riage penalty that other provisions in the Code might ameliorate.17 
At higher income levels, increasing marriage bonuses may not be worth the 
lost revenue. But the TCJA increased marriage bonuses by doubling the rate 
 
13. For example, in 2017, a couple with $400,000 in joint income (earned by either spouse) would 
have paid $102,800 in tax. If they were single and earned all $400,000, they would have paid 
$114,725. They received a marriage bonus from the rate structure. On the other hand, if they 
were single and each earned $200,000, they would have each paid $45,860, or $91,720 total. 
They received a marriage penalty from the rate structure. To play with the numbers, see 2018 
Tax Reform Calculator, TAX FOUND. https://taxfoundation.org/2018-tax 
-reform-calculator [https://perma.cc/LAS2-JULQ]. This illustration uses 2017 numbers be-
cause, as discussed in the text, the TCJA minimizes marriage penalties and expands marriage 
bonuses. In 2018, only the highest income taxpayers with equally divided earnings are poten-
tially subject to marriage penalties. Most married taxpayers—at all income levels—are much 
more likely to enjoy marriage bonuses. 
14. This was much more likely under prior law, when the rate breaks were not double for married 
ﬁlers. See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty The Working Couple’s Dilemma, 47 
FORDHAM L. REV. 27 (1978) (explaining the concept of a marriage penalty). 
15. See I.R.C. § 1(f)(8) (2018) (eliminating the marriage penalty in the 15% bracket starting in 
the 2004 taxable year). 
16. See Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 I.R.B. 489, 491 (showing tax tables with inﬂation adjustments 
for 2018 based on pre-TCJA law with rate breaks that do not double above the 15% marginal 
rate). 
17. See I.R.C. §32(b)(2)(B)(i) (increasing the phaseout amount of adjusted gross income for 
purposes of qualifying for the Earned Income Tax Credit by only $5,000 if ﬁling jointly). 
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breaks for married ﬁlers earning up to $400,000.18 Unlike prior law, which lim-
ited the marriage beneﬁt to lower and middle-income families,19 the TCJA cre-
ates a clear subsidy for affluent traditional families. High-income earners can 
best afford to support stay-at-home spouses, and the marriage bonus incentiv-
izes those spouses to remain out of the market. Stay-at-home spouses perform 
important untaxed work in the household that dual-worker couples must pay 
for out of after-tax dollars. Under the new law, these families are doubly bene-
ﬁtted by both the rate structure and the non-taxation of spousal work performed 
in the home. 
B. Heads of Household Filers 
The TCJA disfavors nontraditional families by imposing new burdens on 
taxpayers ﬁling as heads of household—a ﬁling status generally used by single 
mothers with children.20 On average, heads of households earn substantially less 
income than joint ﬁlers.21 The TCJA imposes a new obligation on tax preparers 
to investigate taxpayers’ eligibility to ﬁle as a head of household.22 Preparers are 
subject to a $500 penalty for each failure to exercise due diligence in making that 
determination.23 Consequently, the new law requires preparers to dispropor-
tionately police single mothers, which operates in contrast to the general expec-
tation that taxpayers will honestly report their tax-relevant information to pre-
parers and the government. 
 
18. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2017); Rev. 
Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392, 394-400 (providing tax rate tables for the TCJA with rate 
breaks that double for joint ﬁlers compared to unmarried taxpayers with up to $400,000 in 
joint income). 
19. See supra text at note 16. 
20. See, American Families and Living Arrangements: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl. FG10 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/families/cps-2017.html (showing that out 
of approximately 12 million single-parent families with children under the age of 18, nearly 
9.5 million, or more than 80%, were headed by single mothers). 
21. In the 2015 tax season, 30.5% of married ﬁling jointly taxpayers had an adjusted gross income 
(AGI) of $50,000 or less, whereas 59.6% of head of households had an AGI of $50,000 or 
less. See All Returns: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax Items, Tax Year 
2015, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in12ms.xls [https://
perma.cc/7EKU-5TQT] (last visited June 24, 2018). 
22. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2058 (2017) (“Any 
person who is a tax return preparer with respect to any return or claim for refund who fails to 
comply with due diligence requirements imposed by the Secretary by regulations with respect 
to determining—(1) eligibility to ﬁle as a head of household (as deﬁned in section 2(b)) on 
the return, or (2) eligibility for, or the amount of, the credit allowable by section 24, 25A(a)(1), 
or 32, shall pay a penalty of $500 for each such failure.”). 
23. See id. 
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The new law makes heads of households objects of suspicion, despite the 
lack of evidence that unmarried adults with children are more likely to cheat on 
their taxes than others. Why single out individuals who are claiming that they 
support children? The law evinces no parallel suspicion of joint ﬁlers with chil-
dren—in other words, the traditional family. It does not require that paid pre-
parers investigate small businesses that may be hiding cash, even though a dis-
proportionate amount of tax evasion occurs in those businesses.24 The new rule 
for tax preparers is simply a way to stigmatize unmarried adults with children, 
and make it harder for them to claim tax beneﬁts. In contrast with the traditional 
family, a single adult with children is not considered normal under the tax law. 
As a practical matter, paid preparers serving low-income communities will 
now be more likely to err on the side of treating mothers as single taxpayers, 
rather than heads of household, and consequently requiring them to pay more 
tax than they legally owe. The presumption that unmarried individuals with 
children are more likely to cheat on their taxes by claiming imaginary children 
feeds the worst stereotypes of the poor. Potential head-of-household ﬁlers are 
the new “welfare queens”—perpetuating the historic demonization of poor 
women.25 And unfortunately, many low-income taxpayers must use paid pre-
parers because they lack access to other advice about preparing their returns, and 
because the earned income tax credit is too complex for many low-income tax-
payers to navigate by themselves.26 There is a history of paid preparers scam-
ming low-income taxpayers to increase their own fees,27 so Congress’s decision 
 
24. See Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008-2010, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 4 (2016), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20esti-
mates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWQ-XGQL] (report-
ing that out of the $264 billion individual income tax gap (i.e., tax not collected) in the tax 
years 2008-2010, $125 billion came from business income). 
25. See generally Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, The Rise and Reign of the Welfare Queen, NEW AM. 
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-135/rise-and-reign-welfare 
-queen [https://perma.cc/3YED-UAK7] (tracing the origin of the term “welfare queen” to a 
Reagan campaign speech made in 1976 and noting the term’s background in a “long and 
deeply racialized history of suspicion of and resentment toward families receiving welfare in 
the United States”). 
26. See Brieﬁng Book: A Citizen’s Guide to the Fascinating (Though Often Complex) Elements of the 
Federal Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. 189 https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles
/brieﬁng-book/tpc-brieﬁng-book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5M-YQ6N]. 
27. See Campbell Robertson, Tax Preparers Targeting Poor with High Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/us/tax-season-brings-big-refunds-and 
-preparers-clamoring-for-a-slice.html [https://perma.cc/2SNQ-PZM9]; see generally Mag-
gie R. Jones, Tax Preparers, Refund Anticipation Products, and EITC Noncompliance (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, CARRA Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2017/adrm/carra-wp-2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BU8T-SGJB]. 
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to encourage preparers to act against the interest of their low-income clients is 
particularly troubling. 
C. Children 
The TCJA simpliﬁes the tax treatment of families with children by repealing 
dependency exemptions for children28 and increasing the child credit in two 
ways: ﬁrst, by increasing the credit amount to $2,000 per child,29 and second, 
by making it available to high-income taxpayers who previously were phased 
out.30 The phase-out range now begins at $400,000 of income for joint ﬁlers, 
and $200,000 for others.31 Because high-income families are better able to afford 
a stay-at-home parent, the increased income threshold is a beneﬁt for those fam-
ilies. Under prior law, the value of dependency exemptions depended on a tax-
payer’s marginal rate, but phased out altogether for high-income taxpayers.32 
The interaction of the changes affecting families is hard to generalize—some 
families will enjoy net beneﬁts from the cumulative changes and others will suf-
fer from greater tax liabilities. 
More importantly, the beneﬁt traditional families enjoy from this legislative 
change is partly a product of what Congress chose not to do. Tax beneﬁts for 
children have long taken two forms: one for children generally,33 and the other 
speciﬁcally for childcare.34 The dependent-care credit is designed for working 
parents, and alleviates the tax burden on parents who must pay for care with 
 
28. Pursuant to the TCJA, all personal exemptions are reduced to zero through 2025. See Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11041(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2082 (2017) (suspending deduc-
tions for personal exemptions). 
29. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11022(a) § (amending I.R.C. § 24 (h)(2) (2012) by increasing the 
credit amount from $1,000 to $2,000). 
30. See id. (adding the new phaseout range at I.R.C. § 24(h)(3) and thus rendering I.R.C. § 24 
(b)(2) moot for the years 2018 through 2025: the previous phaseout amount was $110,000 for 
joint returns, $75,000 for nonmarried individuals, and $55,00 for married individuals ﬁling 
separately). 
31. See id. 
32. See I.R.C. §§ 68(b), 151(d)(3) (2018) (reducing the exemption amount by the “applicable 
percentage” of two percentage points for each $2,500 “by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income for the taxable year exceeds” $300,000 for a married couple ﬁling jointly, $275,000 
for a head of household, and $250,000 for a single taxpayer). 
33. Child Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 24 (2018). 
34. Expenses for Household and Dependent Care Services Necessary for Gainful Employment, 
I.R.C. § 21 (2018). 
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after-tax dollars.35 Tax beneﬁts for childcare beneﬁt only working parents.36 Un-
fortunately, because the credit is nonrefundable, it is unavailable to many parents 
who most need help affording quality care.37 Nonrefundable credits offset tax 
owed, but do not authorize the government to make payments, creating a crucial 
distinction between individuals with income tax liability and those without. 38 
Because low-income taxpayers pay more payroll taxes than income taxes, 39 it is 
arbitrary that tax credits are only allowed against income tax liability. All credits 
would be refundable under a fairer tax law.40 
Instead of doubling the child credit, Congress could have used those re-
sources to make the childcare credit refundable (and larger) so that low-income 
parents would receive a beneﬁt. Tax beneﬁts for expenses incurred in providing 
childcare promotes horizontal equity between taxpayers who pay for care and 
taxpayers who provide the care themselves, generally by a stay-at-home spouse. 
By choosing to increase the credit that is available to all taxpayers, including 
those who do not pay for child care, the TCJA privileges families with a stay-at-
home parent—who enjoy tax beneﬁts without offsetting tax costs. 
 
35. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 132 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565 (changing 
the structure of dependent care expenses from an itemized deduction to a tax credit because 
“the committee believes that such expenses should be viewed as a cost of earning income for 
which all working taxpayers may take a claim”). 
36. See I.RC. §§ 21(a)(1)-(b)(2) (stating that the credit is only applicable toward “employment-
related expenses . . . incurred to enable the taxpayers to be gainfully employed”). 
37. See Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, Cong. Research Serv., R44993, Child and Dependent Care 
Tax Beneﬁts: How They Work and Who Receives Them 1 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R44993.pdf [https://perma.cc/D47N-TD3J]. 
38. See Margot L. Crandall-Hollick & Gene Falk, Cong. Research Serv., IN10816, Tax Reform: 
The Child Credit and the Child Care Credit (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10816
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5XB-X9P6] (“Since the child care credit is not refundable, it can only 
reduce the federal income tax liability of families that would otherwise owe taxes.”). 
39. See Howard Gleckman, For Most Households, It’s About the Payroll Tax, Not the Income Tax, TAX 
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most 
-households-its-about-payroll-tax-not-income-tax [https://perma.cc/Q6LS-DZD5] (“For 
two-thirds of households, the levy that matters is the payroll tax . . . . [I]ncome tax payments 
don’t begin to exceed payroll taxes until household incomes reach six ﬁgures . . . .”). 
40. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Assessing President Trump’s Child Care Proposals, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 
759, 778 (2017). 
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D. Alimony 
The tax treatment of alimony has traditionally allowed the payer a deduc-
tion41 and required that the recipient include the amount in income.42 The TCJA 
changed the scheme so that neither party includes nor deducts alimony pay-
ments, effectively taxing the person who pays the alimony, rather than the one 
who receives it. 43 Although largely conjectural at this point, family-law experts 
predict that the divorce rate will spike in 2018, as the TCJA provision repealing 
the deduction for alimony payments does not go into effect until December 31, 
2018.44 Family law groups have also reported seeing a “real impact” of repealing 
the alimony deduction, with mounting pressure on couples to ﬁnalize divorces 
before the new tax changes come into effect.45 
Since recipients of alimony are necessarily poorer than those who pay it, the 
new rule taxes alimony at the higher rate. For example, if W is taxed at a 10% 
marginal rate, and H is taxed at a 30% marginal rate, $100 earnings by H will be 
subject to $30 in tax, leaving him $70 to pay as alimony. Under prior law, the 
alimony would have been deductible to H, leaving him $100 to pay to W, who 
would have to pay $10 tax on that amount, leaving her $90 to spend. That $20 
tax difference is why the revenue projections for the Act show that the change 
will substantially increase the revenue collected on alimony payments.46 
Because the government will be taxing alimony more heavily than it did be-
fore, divorced couples will have less money between them after tax. In this way, 
the TCJA provides an incentive to stay married. Divorced spouses receive no 
 
41. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(10), 215 (2012) (repealed 2017) (allowing for the deduction of alimony 
payments to be included in adjusted gross income). 
42. See Id. § 61(a)(8) (amended 2017) (including alimony and separate maintenance payments in 
the general deﬁnition of gross income). 
43. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11051(a)-(b), 131 Stat. 2054, 2089-91 (2017) 
(striking I.R.C. § 215; repealing the deduction for alimony payments; and repealing provi-
sions providing for inclusion of alimony in gross income). 
44. See Jonathan Curry, Alimony and Trust Tax Changes Make 2018 ‘Year of Divorce’, 159 TAX NOTES 




46. See Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, “The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N 3 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start
down&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8TGM-539T] (estimating $6.9 billion revenue over the 
10-year window); see also George D. Karibjanian, Richard S. Franklin & Lester B. Law, Mar-
ried Taxpayers: INSIGHT: Alimony, Prenuptial Agreements, and Trusts under the 2017 Tax Act—
Part 1, 101 DAILY TAX REP. 13 (May 24, 2018) (demonstrating that a $60,000 alimony payment 
will generate nearly twice as much, or $20,000 more, in “combined income tax consequences” 
under the new alimony rule). 
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beneﬁt from the substantial marriage bonuses in the new law, and will have a 
higher burden on alimony payments. So, the TCJA favors the traditional family 
in which spouses remain married by simply taxing them less. 
Alimony recipients will no longer pay tax, but they are unlikely to be better 
off. While it is possible that the poorer alimony recipient will have more money 
to spend now that her alimony is not being taxed to her (making her better off ), 
the alimony payer will have less money to spend on alimony because his higher 
tax burden makes him worse off. If family law decisions—whether made by 
courts or agreement of the parties—ignore taxes, then alimony recipients may 
get a windfall from the law’s change. But rational people pay attention to taxes; 
taxes are effective nudges because people do change their behavior in response 
to them.47 
Divorce lawyers should advise their clients to reduce the amount of alimony 
to take account of the tax change. That adjustment should be greater than the 
tax the recipient spouse would have paid under the old law because the payer 
spouse is subject to a higher rate of tax. Because the change in taxation of ali-
mony increases the total tax burden on alimony payments, we can expect both 
parties to be worse off under the new law. 
More importantly, the change in the alimony rules sends a message about 
ﬁnancial responsibility within families.48 In contrast with the new law, the prior 
rule taxing alimony to the recipient created a framework of entitlement, even for 
women who depended on continuing ﬁnancial support from their ex-husbands. 
Taxing alimony to the recipient is consistent with treating alimony as an earned 
amount, since earnings are always taxed to the earner.49 If we think about mar-
riage as a partnership in which both spouses contribute inputs to produce shared 
returns, then the amounts earned in the market by one spouse are appropriately 
conceptualized as belonging jointly by both spouses. In an entitlement frame-
work, both spouses contribute valuable services, and they share the beneﬁts 
equally, without privileging market returns over nonmarket returns. The joint 
ﬁling system reﬂects this conceptualization, as do the rules for property division 
 
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 583, 583, 585 (2014). 
For more information on nudging, see, generally, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
48. This message is particularly important given the rarity of alimony payments. See Beth Pinsker, 
Breadwinning Women Are Driving Alimony Reform, TIME: Money (Nov. 17, 2015), http://time
.com/money/4116161/alimony-reform-spousal-support [https://perma.cc/9KYG-NJU9] 
(stating that according to the 2010 Census, there are 400,000 alimony recipients made per 
year, 3% of which are male; “[u]nlike child support, which is common when [a] divorcing 
couple has kids, alimony awards have always been very rare, going from about 25% of cases 
in the 1960s to about 10% today”). 
49. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940) (“The dominant purpose of the revenue laws 
is the taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it . . . .”). 
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in divorce.50 Prior law for alimony was also consistent with ownership rights for 
both spouses because divorcing spouses who received alimony included that al-
imony in income, like they would any other amount that they earned. The old 
rule signaled that alimony recipients deserved the alimony they received. 
The new law changes that conceptualization by emphasizing the payor’s 
ownership and entitlement to the funds and treating the transfer from the payor 
to the ex-spouse like child support or a gift for tax purposes. This framework 
empowers market earners and weakens claims that nonmarket earners may have 
on family resources. In this story, alimony-receiving women are like dependent 
children who need to be supported, rather than equal partners in a community 
venture that produces both monetary and nonmonetary beneﬁts for its mem-
bers. By treating amounts paid as alimony the same as amounts paid to support 
one’s children—whether those children consume in the parent’s household or 
not51—the new law implies that ex-spouses are still ﬁnancially dependent mem-
bers of the market earner’s household. 
In returning to the common law regarding alimony, we also return to an out-
dated notion about family economic power and responsibility. It is the responsi-
bility of parents to support their children—parents have all the economic power 
in that relationship. The new alimony rule puts ex-husbands in the parent role, 
which suggests that it is the responsibility of former spouses to continue their 
spousal support after the marriage ends. Like child support, this approach con-
centrates power in the hands of the market earner, even though the non-market 
worker contributes substantial value to the family. In this way, the TCJA en-
trenches the power structure of the single-earner family, but does nothing to 
improve the ﬁnancial well-being of dependent spouses. Because these are tax 
rules, they can change the price of paying alimony, but they cannot change the 
rules about when it is paid or how much former spouses receive pre-tax. Nor-
malizing the dependent spouse in the tax law, as the TCJA does, does nothing to 
guarantee her ﬁnancial support in property or family law. 
Alimony rules are a poor way to encourage behavior in marriages because the 
timing is off. Presumably, spouses who will eventually receive alimony do not, at 
the time they are deciding whether to work in the market, think they will need 
it. They are simply not thinking about the consequences of divorce at that time. 
If they had anticipated the need for alimony, they would likely have developed 
 
50. I.R.C. § 1041 (2018) treats property division between spouses as a non-recognition event so 
that each spouse owns the property with a carryover basis from the marriage. 
51. The tax treatment of child support does not depend on which parent buys the food and cloth-
ing for the children. Child support has never been deductible and is treated as taxable con-
sumption to the earner parent. Tax Information for Non-Custodial Parents, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. (2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4449.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA6F 
-HM8B]. 
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more marketable skills or married another partner, making alimony unnecessary. 
The Internal Revenue Code has long encouraged secondary earners to be de-
pendent on primary earners for ﬁnancial support, while performing untaxed 
household work, rather than earning wages.52 The new alimony rules do not 
incentivize behavior throughout the marriage in the same way that the exclusion 
for imputed income and marriage bonuses incentivize secondary earners to stay 
out of the market. 
The important incentive effects connected to the tax rules for alimony, then, 
must coincide with decisions about alimony. By the time of divorce, the second-
ary earner is ﬁnancially dependent. At that time, the new law removes any in-
centive for primary earners to pay amounts as alimony, rather than child support, 
since the tax treatment of alimony and child support are now the same. The pay-
ment of child support in place of alimony might beneﬁt children, but at a poten-
tial cost to their mothers. Even more important, as discussed above, the TCJA 
increases the after-tax cost of alimony payments, so we can expect that the 
amount and frequency of alimony will diminish under the new law. The TCJA’s 
economic effects are likely to contribute to the greater impoverishment of di-
vorced women. Its expressive effects are likely to contribute to their social dis-
empowerment. 
i i .  individuals have greater entitlement to their capital 
than to their labor 
The primary goal of the TCJA was to cut the rate of tax on corporate in-
come,53 and many tax policy experts—across the political spectrum—agreed that 
the U.S income tax rate was too high by global standards.54 Corporate income is 
potentially taxed twice—at the corporate level (when earned) and at the share-
holder level (when paid out as dividends). The double-tax regime can impose 
 
52. See generally Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005) (discussing the non-taxation of imputed income, and the stack-
ing of secondary earner income that imposes high rates on the ﬁrst dollars of income). 
53. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 12001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092-94 (2017) 
(repealing the tax for corporations under the alternative minimum tax); see also id. § 13001 
(changing the corporate tax rate to 21% of taxable income). 
54. See Danielle Kurtzleben, FACT CHECK: Does the U.S. Have the Highest Corporate Tax Rate in 
the World?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/07
/541797699/fact-check-does-the-u-s-have-the-highest-corporate-tax-rate-in-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/GAE3-Q523]. President Obama was committed to lowering the corporate 
rate. See Zachary Goldfarb, Obama Proposes Lowering Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-to 
-propose-lowering-corporate-tax-rate-to-28-percent/2012/02/22/gIQA1sjdSR_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/W3QB-ZA9Q]. 
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higher effective rates on corporate income than noncorporate income. But the 
rationale for reducing corporate rates does not extend beyond corporations. 
Nevertheless, the TCJA also substantially reduced the tax imposed on in-
come from noncorporate businesses, such as partnerships and other pass-
through entities that tax income only to the owners and not to the entity.55 Con-
sequently, the overall effect of the law is to reduce the tax burden across all hold-
ers of capital—people who earn money through investments. The TCJA exacer-
bated a distinction that already existed in the tax law. Capital income has long 
been subject to preferential rates56 and exempt from the payroll tax,57 but now it 
is even more preferred, regardless of the form. 
A tax preference can be justiﬁed on fairness grounds if the taxpayer has a 
greater moral claim to some income than other income, or if the tax would im-
pose greater harm in some cases than in others. For example, an income tax 
might include the increase in value of a taxpayer’s home over the course of a 
year.58 But a just tax system might exclude that value if it required taxpayers to 
sell their homes and move their families. The greater an individual’s moral claim 
to something, the less legitimate it is for the government to take it through co-
ercion. Income taxation can be justiﬁed because individuals do not have moral 
claims to all of their pre-tax income.59 
Proponents of the preference for capital income do not justify it on these 
terms. They argue that lower taxes on capital income incentivize more capital 
investment. That may be true, but it also may not be.60 In any case, that argu-
ment changes the subject because it is an efficiency argument, not an argument 
about social meaning and justice. Efficiency may be an important social value, 
but where efficiency and fairness are in tension, policymakers should be explicit 
 
55. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 11011-12, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063-72 (2017) (“De-
duction for Qualiﬁed Business Income of Pass-Thru Entities”). 
56. I.R.C. §1(h) (2018). 
57. The payroll tax is levied only on wage income. Two-thirds of taxpayers pay more payroll tax 
than income tax. See Roberton C. Williams, Most Americans Pay More Payroll Tax than Income 
Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox
/most-americans-pay-more-payroll-tax-income-tax [https://perma.cc/9J6V-SZ87]. 
58. The theoretical deﬁnition of income includes all accessions to wealth. U.S. law includes a re-
alization requirement that limits the inclusion to accessions that are liquidated. See Ilan 
Benshalom & Kendra Stead, Realization and Progressivity, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 43, 50-51 (2011). 
59. See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
15 (2002) (questioning the “‘everyday’ libertarianism” of the pre-tax income framework); id. 
at 31-37. 
60. See JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42111, TAX RATES AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 7, 9 (Jan. 2, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42111.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W6SH-ZU3E] (“A review of statistical evidence suggests that both labor supply 
and savings and investment are relatively insensitive to tax rates.”). 
the social meaning of the tax cuts and jobs act 
417 
about favoring one or the other. Policymakers should not reﬂexively prioritize 
efficiency over other public values, particularly in regulating economic entitle-
ments. 
Since all income is made possible by myriad forces, both public and private, 
an individual is only entitled to some of the income she creates. A lawyer earns 
income based on her own personal talent and effort, but also because govern-
ment creates institutions that make her talents and efforts meaningful to others. 
Business income is the product of capital, labor, and social institutions, and tax-
ation is necessary to distribute the products of social cooperation among all the 
people who deserve it.61 The TCJA’s tax reduction on business income strength-
ens the ownership claim of capital holders to that income. But this claim is based 
on a mistaken understanding of the social cooperation necessary to create value. 
Determining who deserves a share of income is a decision made politically, 
but it is a fundamental question of fairness. Taxation is a tool of distributive jus-
tice because taxes can correct distributional injustices in the market. While mar-
kets can be helpful in determining desert,62 they are not designed to allocate re-
sources according to a moral principle. Markets are designed to increase 
efficiency, not justice.63 Laws must supplement markets to achieve justice. In-
come taxation is a feature of just societies because people do not have unfettered 
rights to every dollar of pretax income they earn.64 
For example, if free markets systematically undercompensated workers for 
their contribution to the social product, the law might tax-prefer their earnings 
compared to other types of income. Such a law could give workers a greater 
moral claim to their pretax income by granting them dominion and control over 
a greater percentage of their pre-tax income. The same is true for investors. In 
instituting a preference for a broad range of investment income, the TCJA re-
ﬂects the notion that investors have a stronger claim to their earnings than do 
others. Elevating capital holders to a preferred place by taxing their income less 
heavily than the income of workers implies greater moral rights to that income. 
 
61. See Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2617 
(2016) (“A fair shares framework sees the tax system as a mechanism for dividing the returns 
to social cooperation among members of society.”). 
62. Some political philosophers have recognized that markets may have a circumscribed role in 
distributive justice. See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (starting with an auction model to build a theory of distributive 
justice using insurance concepts and taxation). 
63. Elizabeth Anderson explains why markets must be limited if individuals are to enjoy freedom 
and autonomy. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141-167 
(1993). 
64. Property is conventional. This is Murphy and Nagel’s main point. See MURPHY & NAGEL, su-
pra note 59, at 8 (“If there is a dominant theme that runs through our discussion, it is this: 
Private property is a legal convention, deﬁned in part by the tax system.”). 
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A lower, preferential rate of tax on capital income suggests that market returns 
to capital holders are a closer approximation of what capital holders deserve; the 
heavier tax on labor suggests that their market returns are excessive by compar-
ison. 
As income inequality has increased, capital holders have enjoyed a greater 
share of overall market returns.65 Because capital is more mobile than labor, 
globalization has allowed capital to seek out greater returns, imposing pressure 
on labor. The weakening of labor’s power, including the decline in unions,66 has 
left labor earners unable to push back in the market. The market has already 
shifted a substantial share of the social product to holders of capital, so the tax 
law’s more burdensome treatment of income from work exacerbates a market 
dynamic already in effect. 
Given the philosophical substructure of the tax law, a policy that implies 
greater moral entitlement to capital returns than labor returns is odd. One prin-
ciple underlying much economic policy reﬂected in the tax law is that individuals 
own their labor.67 The theoretical entitlement to earnings on capital stems from 
the ownership of labor, since capital must have been derived from labor at some 
point. Libertarian arguments make the strongest moral claims to capital income, 
but those claims are based on historical principles of entitlement that start with 
a person’s right to own his labor and base the right to investment income on that 
 
65. See Thomas L. Hungerford, Cong. Research Serv., R42131, Changes in the Distribution of 
Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital In-
come, and Tax Policy 14 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42131.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HLM7-5ZJ6] (“Changes in income from capital gains and dividends were the single largest 
contributor to rising income inequality between 1996 and 2006.”). 
66. See Justin Fox, What Unions No Longer Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 1, 2014), https://hbr.org
/2014/09/what-unions-no-longer-do [https://perma.cc/W73N-GPTU] (“Forty years ago, 
about [a] quarter of American workers belonged to unions . . . . Now union membership is 
down to 11.2% of the U.S. workforce, and it’s increasingly concentrated in the public sector — 
only 6.7% of private-sector workers were union members in 2013.”). Government policy—not 
just the market—contributed to the decline in unions. See Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, The Right 
to Work Really Means the Right to Work for Less, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/04/24/the-right-to-work 
-really-means-the-right-to-work-for-less/ [https://perma.cc/TE8U-P8B7] (discussing the 
development of right to work laws that undermine unions). 
67. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (John Boyle ed., 1773) (1689) 
(describing the labor theory of property). 
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history.68 In prior work, I have been critical of this analysis.69 Nevertheless, the 
regime in the TCJA turns it on its head: If the taxation of capital gains cannot be 
justiﬁed in a libertarian framework, then the taxation of labor returns is even less 
legitimate. The TCJA gets it backwards by taxing labor income much more heav-
ily than it taxes capital income. 
i i i .  people are autonomous individuals  
It has been recognized that the tax law assumes people are autonomous, and 
I have previously argued that it is important for the tax law to respect individual 
autonomy.70 The TCJA takes that conception further than prior law by discour-
aging interdependence among individuals in employment relationships and lo-
cal communities. The TCJA discourages employer-employee relationships, 
compared to independent contractor status. It also rejects the interdependence 
of communities by conceptualizing state and local taxes as equivalent to private 
consumption expenditures. 
The employer-employee context and the local-government context raise dif-
ferent policy concerns that inform the desirability of interdependence.71 In the 
employment relationship, interdependence has traditionally implied health in-
surance and retirement beneﬁts, so that interdependence has been necessary for 
the ﬁnancial and personal security of workers. In a society (unlike the United 
States) with government-provided health insurance and generous public retire-
ment beneﬁts, employer-employee interdependence would be neither necessary 
nor desirable. Employee dependence on employer-speciﬁc beneﬁts discourages 
job mobility and entrepreneurship. But weakening the bond between employers 
and employees is troublesome if it strips individuals of security and leaves them 
vulnerable. 
In the local community context, increasing atomization may increase the 
likelihood that localities offer different packages of goods and services that indi-
viduals want. That is desirable if efficiency is the goal and everyone can afford a 
decent package. If people cannot afford the precise package they want, then 
treating taxpayers as though they are simply buying consumer goods is unlikely 
 
68. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 170 (1974) (beginning with taxation as 
slavery based on labor earnings and then extending the analysis to capital earnings based on 
a theory of historical entitlement). 
69. Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 256-57 
(2011) (comparing John Rawls and Robert Nozick and arguing that liberty derives from equal 
respect for people, not property rights). 
70. See id. at 237 (treating autonomy as a central value in a just tax system). 
71. Spousal dependence also raises unique issues. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
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to improve overall welfare. In a welfarist framework, the distribution of beneﬁts 
to those who can afford them least creates the greatest welfare gains. Interde-
pendence in communities allows small welfare losses to some members of the 
community to be outweighed by large gains to others. Discouraging community 
interdependence threatens to leave the most needy without adequate public 
goods and services. 
A. Independent Contractors 
The new law creates incentives to operate as an independent contractor, or 
sole proprietor, rather than as an employee. Independent contractors are eligible 
for the new lower rate of tax for pass-through businesses72 and they are also al-
lowed to deduct all their expenses in operating the business.73 By contrast, if 
characterized as an employee, the same person must pay a higher rate of tax and 
is not allowed to deduct employee business expenses under the new law.74 The 
preference for independent contractors reinforces the notion that individuals are 
autonomous and independent of one another. An employer-employee relation-
ship implies substantial reciprocal obligation. 
This is an important shift in the message of the tax law, and is actually quite 
perplexing, given other provisions favoring employer-employee interdepend-
ence that remain in the Internal Revenue Code. The tax law has long favored the 
employer-employee relationship as the source for employee consumption ex-
penditures. Many employee expenses that incur tax when made directly by em-
ployees have long been tax-free if provided directly by employers.75 The TCJA 
did not change the preexisting preference for employee dependence on em-
ployer-provided beneﬁts—the tax savings for employer-provided education, 
 
72. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 11011-12, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063-72 (2017) (“De-
duction for Qualiﬁed Business Income of Pass-Thru Entities”). 
73. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11011(a) (deﬁning qualiﬁed items of income, gain, deduction, and 
loss as anything “effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the 
United States”). 
74. The TCJA suspended through 2025 the deduction for miscellaneous itemized expenses, in-
cluding the trade or business expenses of employees that had long been carved out of I.R.C. 
§62(a)(2)(A), but allowed below the line. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11045. 
75. When purchased directly by employers, employees need not include in taxable compensation 
the value of employment-related goods and consumption. But employees are not permitted a 
deduction when they purchase the same goods and services out of their own after-tax income. 
See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A) (2018) (including reimbursed expenses of employees as part of def-
inition of adjusted gross income, so long as the expenses qualiﬁed under part VI—i.e., the 
itemized deductions for individuals and corporations). 
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child care, retirement savings, and health insurance remain in the law post-
TCJA, beside the new law’s incentive to sever the employer-employee bond. 76 
Confusing matters further, the TCJA makes employee business expenses 
nondeductible, even though employees can exclude those amounts when their 
employers pay for them.77 For example, an employee who buys her own work 
tools must now pay for them with after-tax income, and is no longer allowed a 
deduction. But an employee does not need to include the value of tools that an 
employer buys for her,78 and nor does she need to pay tax on amounts she spends 
on tools that are reimbursed by her employer.79 Consequently, it continues to be 
advantageous to be an employee in this respect. 
Whether an individual is better off as an employee or an independent con-
tractor depends on both the rate of tax applied to the income and the items that 
must be included in the tax base. Under the new law, the determination will be 
different for workers in different businesses—employees with few excluded ben-
eﬁts will prefer to become independent contractors to get the lower rate. But 
employees with lots of excluded beneﬁts may prefer the higher rate on the 
smaller base. Beyond the individual tax calculus, independent contractors may 
be worse off than employees to the extent that they have an incentive to compete 
against one another, rather than collaborate for better pay or conditions. 
Confusing matters further, the new law carves out certain professions, in-
cluding doctors, lawyers, accountants, and artists, from the reduced pass-
through rate—for no apparent reason.80 Encouraging some employees to be-
come independent contractors could have an important effect on the nature of 
business relationships apart from taxation. Whether the law should encourage 
interdependence between employers and employees, or independence by service 
providers is a difficult policy question, but Congress should be more purposeful 
about the project. 
 
76. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 106 (health insurance); § 119 (meals & housing); § 127 (education); § 129 
(dependent care); § 401(retirement savings). 
77. See id. § 62(a)(2)(A) . 
78. The exclusion for “working condition” fringe beneﬁts was unchanged in the law. See id. 
§ 132(a)(3). 
79. See id. § 62(a)(2). 
80. See Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, 1 BRITISH TAX REV. 49, 51 
(2018) (“The likes of real estate, oil and gas, manufacturing, and retailing are apparently 
‘good,’ while the likes of medicine, law, accounting, consulting, the arts, professional sports, 
and corporate management are apparently less good, but one cannot quite tell why.”). Shaviro 
ultimately attributed the classiﬁcation to a “sociological divide between the business and ed-
ucated classes.” Id. at 58. 
the yale law journal forum October 25, 2018 
422 
B. State and Local Tax Deduction 
Diminution of the deduction for state and local taxes81 was one of the most 
contested provisions in the new law.82 Critics have correctly recognized the pro-
vision as a way for Republicans in Congress—who passed the TCJA without a 
single Democratic vote—to punish blue states and raise taxes primarily on afflu-
ent Democrats.83 So perhaps there is no identiﬁable value hidden in the amend-
ment to the deduction. 
But a deeper analysis of the change reveals a potential shift in thinking about 
what state and local taxes do. It is possible to conceptualize state and local taxes 
as collective returns to communities, which should be shared by members of 
those communities. Institutions of government foster pretax income at every 
level, so state and local taxes, like federal taxes, can be understood as market-
correcting tools that direct returns to communities, rather than individuals.84 In 
this understanding, state and local taxes are the distribution of social returns, so 
taxpayers are not individually entitled to those amounts. 
This interpretation challenges inclusion in the federal tax base, providing a 
theoretical justiﬁcation for the deduction. Because individuals do not enjoy do-
minion and control, the federal government should not consider those tax pay-
ments to be gross income of the individual taxpayers. Amounts paid in tax to 
states and localities do not constitute an accession to the personal wealth of the 
individuals who pay them. State and local taxes are collected under legal coer-
cion, and are never really part of the private resources of state residents. Our 
ability to pay federal tax, in this conception, is affected by how much other tax 
we pay, as well as how much we earn. A federal tax deduction is necessary to 
account for the diminution in resources that state taxpayers have. 
This conception of state and local taxes says nothing about whether individ-
uals should have to include the beneﬁts they receive from government in taxable 
income, but including beneﬁts is not wholly consistent with the ability-to-pay 
 
81. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2085-86 (2017) (re-
ducing the aggregate amount of state and local taxes to be taken into account to $10,000, or 
$5,000 in the case of a married individual ﬁling a separate return). 
82. See Dylan Matthews, The State and Local Tax Deduction, Explained, VOX (Nov. 2, 2017, 11:25 
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/30/16557554/the-state-and-local 
-tax-deduction-explained [https://perma.cc/AC6V-WYLL]. 
83. See Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious 
Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 319-22 (2018). 
84. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2617 (“[I]ndividuals are not entitled to their entire pre-tax income 
because part of that income is the return to social cooperation that must be shared with oth-
ers.”). 
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norm underlying income taxation. To the extent that governments provide ben-
eﬁts to individuals, the tax system could require inclusion. Individuals could be 
taxed on the value of the public education they receive, the clean water they 
drink, and the military protection they enjoy. Under current law, where govern-
ment beneﬁts are provided in cash, they are sometimes included in gross income 
and subject to tax.85 Generally, however, such beneﬁts are ignored for tax pur-
poses. The valuation challenges in including all government beneﬁts in taxable 
income would be substantial, and beneﬁts taxation is an independent theory for 
tax design that has never received substantial traction.86 
The TCJA treats state and local taxes just like private consumption. That 
model assumes that people pay taxes to buy services like schools and roads.87 
Since expenditures for living expenses and luxuries are not deductible under fed-
eral law,88 state and local taxes should not be deductible if they are equivalent 
expenditures. If individuals receive valuable consumption in return for their 
taxes, then those taxes should not be deductible for purposes of measuring abil-
ity to pay other taxes. Where state and local taxes are simple consumption ex-
penses, they resemble other nondeductible items. Taxpayers who do not value 
schools or roads are free to move to other jurisdictions that offer the package of 
taxes and services that they prefer.89 
At the local level, this conception of taxes is plausible. But the larger the tax-
ing jurisdiction, the less compelling this private-consumption story becomes. At 
the state level, surely, taxes do not translate into the equivalent of fees for services 
provided to individuals. This approach to state and local taxes rejects the notion 
of a shared community with public goods that cannot be valued for individuals. 
It assumes that states and localities have no role to play in distributing common 
resources. 
 
85. See I.R.C. § 86 (2018) (taxing some social security beneﬁts). 
86. John Stuart Mill wrote of beneﬁts taxation: “If there were any justice, therefore, in the theory 
of justice now under consideration, those who are least capable of helping or defending them-
selves, being those to whom the protection of government is the most indispensable, ought 
to pay the greatest share of its price: the reverse of the true idea of distributive justice, which 
consists not in imitating but in redressing the inequalities and wrongs of nature.” JOHN STU-
ART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 485 (Longmans, Green & Co. ed., 1904) (1848). 
87. See Michael Leachman & Iris J. Law, Eliminating State and Local Tax Deduction to Pay for Tax 
Cuts for Wealthy a Bad Deal for Most Americans, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 19, 
2017) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/atoms/ﬁles/10-19-17sfp.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8TG4-8735]. 
88. See I.R.C. § 262 (listing personal, living, and family expenses under Title IX – Items Not 
Deductible). 
89. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON. 416, 420 
(1956). 
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It is ironic that Republicans are the ones sending this message about state 
and local taxes, because they have traditionally argued more vehemently than 
Democrats in favor of state sovereignty.90 The conception of state and local taxes 
as paying for private consumption reduces the power and function of the states 
in a federal system. Under the TCJA, the federal government becomes the sole 
protector of the public interest and the sole provider of public goods, with states 
and localities serving up private consumption according to market demands. 
The likely effect is a decline in public goods like infrastructure, education, and 
health care ﬁnanced by the states. 
iv.  charity is  for the rich  
Philanthropy requires resources, so it is nothing new that the wealthy are the 
most important donors to charity. Recent research shows that even before the 
TCJA, charitable contributions were concentrated in a diminishing slice of the 
population.91 Nevertheless, the tax law has historically supported charitable giv-
ing of a broader segment of taxpayers by allowing a charitable deduction for all 
itemizers. In addition, the Code has long limited the tax beneﬁts attributable to 
charitable giving so that even the most generous philanthropists could not avoid 
paying taxes entirely.92 While these rules have allowed considerable plutocratic 
power and government subsidy to donations by the rich, the TCJA enables this 
bias substantially more by reducing the number of itemizers and increasing the 
level of allowable deductions. The TCJA does not fundamentally change the 
Code’s approach to charitable giving, but it exacerbates (and normalizes) the 
elitism that has long underlied the law.93 This is troubling given other changes 
 
90. See John Stoehr, Forfeiting Federalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-12-06/gop-tax 
-plan-to-end-state-and-local-tax-deductions-undermines-federalism [https://perma.cc
/G2CJ-9JTM] (stating the then-proposed tax bill would be a “violation of the states’ rights 
the Republicans say they alone represent” by “‘federaliz[ing]’ revenue that would have re-
mained in states under the current system”). 
91. See Nicolas J. Duquette, Top Donors and the Rising Concentration of Giving in the United 
States, 1960-2012, at 1 (June 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3203135. 
92. I.R.C.§ 170(b) (2018). 
93. I have previously taken a nuanced approach to the plutocracy of the charitable deduction. See 
Linda Sugin, Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming Rights, Inequality and Social Norms, 
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 139-40 (2018) (defending elite philanthropy). Since I have argued that 
government should be responsible for more public provision, the ideal role of philanthropy is 
narrower than its current function. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2607 (“Charities have an im-
portant role in our heterogeneous society connected to fostering pluralism and diversity. They 
should not relieve the government of its more fundamental role in ensuring just institu-
tions.”). 
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wrought by the TCJA: tax cuts for the rich and bigger government deﬁcits in the 
future. Concentrating philanthropy among the most elite is only tolerable if 
there is a sufficient level of taxation overall to guarantee public support of public 
priorities so that government leaves little need for private organizations to ﬁll. 
The TCJA simpliﬁed taxes for millions of Americans by substantially in-
creasing the standard deduction (to $12,000 for single ﬁlers and $24,000 for 
joint ﬁlers).94 The charitable deduction is only available to taxpayers who item-
ize, so only taxpayers whose total itemized deductions exceed the standard de-
duction will continue to itemize. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the TCJA 
will reduce the number of taxpayers claiming the charitable contribution deduc-
tion by 21 million.95 While fewer taxpayers in the top 1% are projected to claim 
the deduction, fewer than half of former claimants below the 95th percentile will 
continue to take the deduction.96 
The charitable deduction operates as a government subsidy to charities cho-
sen by taxpayers. For example, an individual in the 35% rate bracket receives $35 
in tax savings on a $100 gift to charity. When she makes that gift, it has the same 
effect as her paying $65 from her after-tax income and directing the government 
to pay the other $35.97 Consequently, the charitable deduction has been com-
pared to a government matching grant.98 Individuals who can claim the charita-
ble deduction are able to direct government subsidies to the charities of their 
choosing, while those who cannot claim the deduction must ﬁnance their chari-
table support without the government’s help.99 
 
94. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2085-86 (2017) 
(amending I.R.C. § 64(c) (2012)). 
95. See Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking the Charitable Deduction Under 
the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox
/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-deduction-under-tcja [https://perma.cc
/5VL5-UA2H]; see also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONGR. RES. SERV., IN10820, TAX INCENTIVES 
FOR CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R. 1), at 1 (2017), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/IN10820.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE76-G6TF] (noting that the percentage of 
taxpayers itemizing deductions is estimated to decrease from 29% to 6% under the new tax 
law). 
96. See Gleckman, supra note 95. 
97. This is the core of tax expenditure analysis. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: 
THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 50-64 (1973). I have elsewhere been critical of the sim-
pler version of tax expenditure analysis. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Dis-
tributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23-25 (2011) (“[I]t is important to know whether a pro-
vision actually operates as a subsidy or as an incentive, and who is subsidized or 
incentivized . . . .”). 
98. See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute 
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 380 (1972). 
99. The charitable deduction has been known to provide an upside-down subsidy. See SURREY, 
supra note 97, at 136. 
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Even before the TCJA was enacted, nonitemizers were ineligible for the char-
itable deduction.100 Many of them gave to charity, and many will continue to do 
so despite the absence of federal subsidy. There are perennial proposals to extend 
the charitable deduction to nonitemizers or to convert the deduction into a re-
fundable credit (which would be available to both itemizers and nonitemizers) 
in order to democratize the federal subsidy.101 Economists disagree about the 
efficacy of the charitable deduction as an incentive to give to charity.102 The TCJA 
is a natural experiment, and scholars will surely study the change in giving pat-
terns for taxpayers who itemized prior to the TCJA but claim the standard de-
duction in the future. New standard deduction claimants may reduce their char-
itable giving. But even if they continue to give, the new law directs zero dollars 
of federal subsidy to the charities chosen by nonitemizers. 
By subsidizing only charitable gifts made by the wealthy, the TCJA sends the 
message that charity is an important public priority for the rich, but not for oth-
ers. This is problematic. First, it reinforces the notion that government need not 
provide the infrastructure necessary for equality and opportunity since the rich 
have a responsibility to provide private support for public goods. Relatedly, this 
message gives the rich the false and dangerous impression that their charitable 
giving is a reasonable substitute for paying taxes. Finally, the rich and the poor 
support different types of institutions, and privileging the giving of the rich un-
dervalues the types of institutions supported by the poor.103 
While reducing the number of taxpayers eligible to claim a deduction for 
charity, the TCJA also raised the limit on how much itemizing taxpayers may 
deduct, by raising the cap on deductibility from 50% to 60% of a donor’s in-
come.104 The Code has long capped charitable deductions to ensure that even 
 
100. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (listing charitable contribution reporting requirements under Part VI 
– Itemized Deductions for Individuals and Corporations). 
101. See generally Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 
(2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports 
/charitablecontributions.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EL-BVB7] (reviewing the pros and cons of 
various redesigns). 
102. See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK 570 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“[I]t is still unclear how 
much changes in price affect charitable giving.”). 
103. The rich support education more than any other purpose, while the poor support religion 
most. See WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 15 (Charles Clodfelter ed., Univ. 
of Chi. Press, 1992). 
104. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11023(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2074-75 (2017) 
(amending I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2012)): “In the case of any contribution of cash to an organi-
zation described in subparagraph (A), the total amount of such contributions which may be 
taken into account under subsection (a) for any taxable year . . . shall not exceed 60 percent 
of the taxpayer’s contribution base for such year.”). 
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very charitable taxpayers must pay some tax.105 Before the change, taxpayers 
could deduct only half their income as charitable deductions, and now, they can 
deduct up to 60%. A cap on deductibility signals that charitable gifts are not a 
substitute for paying taxes; everyone must contribute a fair share to the expenses 
chosen by elected officials, and there is no private substitute for supporting those 
public purposes. Raising the cap undermines the message of compelled contri-
bution to democratically determined priorities—it implies that amounts given to 
private institutions committed to public purposes resemble taxes paid to gov-
ernments.106 Of course, the change in the cap is moderate—from 50% to 60%, 
so the revenue effects will be small, but the fact that Congress made any change 
is revealing. 
The 50% cap did not present a problem that Congress needed to solve, and 
the change will lose some revenue. The increase to 60% will only provide a ben-
eﬁt to a miniscule number of very wealthy taxpayers who can afford to give more 
than half their income to charity in any year. Hardly anyone faces the cap—the 
average itemizer contributes 2% of income to charity. The way to hit the cap is 
to make large gifts out of wealth rather than income; Warren Buffett has this 
problem.107 The culture of philanthropy among the super-rich is sufficiently 
strong that the cap on deductions has not deterred the richest Americans from 
pledging to give away at least half their wealth.108 The cap primarily functioned 
as a symbol that charitable giving does not satisfy one’s civic obligation to con-
tribute to the social structure,109 and the TCJA undermines this symbol. Charity 
is private in its operation, control, and funding. Charitable decisions are made 
in a plutocratic way. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as it is clear that 
 
105. The charitable contribution deduction dates back to the War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917 
and was initially capped at 15% of a taxpayer’s taxable net income. While Congress enacted 
an unlimited charitable contribution deduction for any taxpayer who donated more than 90% 
of her taxable income for that year and for eight of the preceding ten years, that provision was 
phased out in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to prevent tax abuse. The legislative history for the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 indicates that the unlimited charitable contribution deduction was 
eliminated because it “allowed a small number of high-income persons to pay little or no tax 
on their income,” which members of Congress felt should not be allowed and instead stated 
that charity can remain “an equal partner with . . . income,” but should not reduce an indi-
vidual’s tax base by more than one-half. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1698; see Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A 
Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061, 1064-65 (2003). 
106. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2618 (criticizing the equivalence of charitable giving and taxes 
paid). 
107. See Sugin, supra note 93. 
108. See A Commitment to Philanthropy, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/ [https://perma
.cc/B5TC-BQXV] (“The Giving Pledge is a commitment by the world’s wealthiest individuals 
and families to dedicate the majority of their wealth to giving back.”). 
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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taxes are not conﬂated with gifts to charity.110 The more the law allows charitable 
giving to substitute for taxes, the more it legitimates private control of public 
functions. 
v. physical assets are important  
The new law is evidence that congressional policymakers believe in the value 
of tangible things.111 Even though studies have shown that happiness does not 
follow from buying things,112 Americans continue to accumulate a lot of stuff. 
And the new tax law seems to agree that physical things are best. Despite the 
rhetoric about prioritizing jobs for workers,113 the TCJA in fact encourages in-
vestment in long-lived assets more than investment in labor. The new law sub-
sidizes the acquisition of long-lived assets by allowing their entire cost to be de-
ducted in the year of acquisition.114 To the contrary, there is no bonus deduction 
allowed for wages paid to workers.115 If an employer hires people to perform 
services in its business, there is no subsidy because it cannot deduct the cost of 
paying the hirees in the future. The key to the subsidy for physical assets is the 
 
110. This is the main argument in my previous article. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2621. 
111. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13202, 131 Stat. 2054, 2108-09 (2017) 
(“Modiﬁcations to Depreciation Limitations on Luxury Automobiles and Personal Use Prop-
erty”). 
112. See generally Leaf Van Boven, Experientialism, Materialism, and the Pursuit of Happiness, 9 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 132 (2005) (extending ﬁndings from previous studies indicating that material 
acquisitions are negatively associated with happiness by noting current research that demon-
strates that purchases made with the intent of acquiring life experiences make them happier 
than acquiring material possessions). 
113. See Deirdre Walsh et al., White House, GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNN (Dec. 
20, 2017, 5:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trump-tax-bill
/index.html [https://perma.cc/NH2F-7JNJ] (“‘This is truly a case where the results will 
speak for themselves, starting very soon. Jobs, Jobs, Jobs!’ the President tweeted.”). 
114. See Mihir A. Desai, Tax Reform, Round One: Understanding the Real Consequences of the New 
Tax Law, HARV. MAG. (May-June 2018), https://harvardmagazine.com/2018/05 
/mihir-desai-tax-reform [https://perma.cc/ZX9F-AH95] (“[E]xpensing allows the tax rate 
on new investment to become irrelevant. Under expensing, the ﬁrm gets tax relief at the time 
of investment and then later gives up proﬁts—meaning the government is effectively func-
tioning as a joint-venture partner with an ownership level that corresponds to the tax rate. As 
such, the pretax and post-tax rates of return are the same, ensuring no distortion to invest-
ment decisions.”). 
115. An equivalent treatment for labor would allow employers to currently deduct wages to be paid 
to employees in future years. 
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new law’s “expensing” for long-lived physical assets.116 Under income tax prin-
ciples, the cost of long-lived assets should be deducted over time as they are used 
in the business;117 “expensing” allows the entire cost to be deducted in the year 
of acquisition. As others have explained, “[t]he new law subsidizes rather than 
taxes capital investments. In other words, the tax act subsidizes ﬁrms that buy 
robots over ﬁrms that hire new workers.”118 
Standard tax policy analysis recognizes that deducting the entire cost of a 
long-lived asset in the year it is acquired is economically equivalent to exempting 
the future income from that asset from tax.119 This happens because the deduc-
tion allowed in the year of acquisition when a capital asset is expensed is bigger 
than the actual cost to the taxpayer in that year, since the asset will be useful in 
the business over an extended period. For example, if a taxpayer buys a machine 
that lasts ﬁve years for $100, part of that $100 is a cost of doing business in years 
two through ﬁve, but expensing allows it all to be deducted in year one. The 
deduction in the year of acquisition reduces the investor’s tax in year one, saving 
the investor taxes on other income equal to the cost ($100) multiplied by the 
taxpayer’s tax rate (assume 30%), or $30. The tax savings in the year of acquisi-
tion can be conceptualized as a government co-investment in the asset—the gov-
ernment invests $30 out of the $100 cost of the asset. The investor’s out-of-
pocket investment is only $70. The government’s investment is repaid in later 
years when taxes are owed on income generated from the asset.120 While techni-
cally the investor makes a tax payment when the asset earns income, their rate of 
return is not diminished by tax. 
 
116. See Tax Cuts and Job Act, § 13201 (“Temporary 100-Percent Expensing for Certain Business 
Assets”). 
117. This is depreciation. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (2018) (authorizing a deduction for a “reasonable 
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear” of capital assets). 
118. Edward Kleinbard, Tax Policy is a Bore, Until They Take Your Social Security and Medicare Away, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018, 4:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la 
-oe-kleinbard-tax-health-20180415-story.html [https://perma.cc/E4TY-MVJF]. 
119. See Desai, supra note 114. 
120. Consider this example: Assume the tax rate is a ﬂat 30% and the rate of return is 10%. TP 
earns $100 in year one. He needs to pay $30 tax on the amount, leaving him $70 to spend. If 
he invests instead, he will be entitled to expense the investment, so he has a $100 deduction 
that allows him to invest $100 without any tax burden. A year later, the $100 grows to $110. 
If he liquidates that to spend, he will owe tax at 30% or $33, leaving him $77. If he had invested 
the original after-tax amount, $70 invested at 10% grows to $77 after a year; in an income tax, 
the $7 would be subject to a 30% tax, leaving the investor with $4.66, for a total of $74.66. In 
the expensed example, the taxpayer has $77 to spend. So, the amount available to spend with 
expensing the investment is the same as the amount available to spend if the investment in-
come (the $7) is explicitly exempt from tax. 
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Deducting the full cost in the year of acquisition is the key to effectively ex-
empting the income from tax. Any tax paid in later years can be understood as 
the government receiving a return on its earlier investment. It does not matter 
what the tax rate is, as long as the rate of the deduction in the year of acquisition 
is the same as the rate of the amounts that are later included in income subject 
to tax. It is as though the government invested 25%, 30%, or 50% of the cost of 
the asset, and is later entitled to the same 25%, 30%, or 50% of the asset’s income. 
The preference for things rather than people is reinforced by the TCJA’s 
treatment of capital income compared to labor income. While labor has long 
been subject to more burdensome taxation than capital,121 the TCJA exacerbates 
this inequality. The TCJA did not change the payroll tax, which is a tax imposed 
only on people who work. Instead, Congress reduced business taxes of all sorts—
corporate and pass-through taxation,122 as well as reducing the only tax the 
United States has on accumulations of wealth, the estate and gift tax.123 All of 
these changes favor things over people, stuff over services, physical goods over 
experiences. 
The real message of these provisions directly contradicts the rhetoric that its 
adopters spread about the law. The TCJA’s proponents claimed that the law was 
about creating jobs and improving the well-being of workers. But the law instead 
favors machines and business owners. While it is possible to make an argument 
that investments in machines will require more people, or that more money for 
investors will trickle down to better wages for workers, there is nothing in the 
rules adopted in the TCJA that gives taxpayers incentives for the second order 
effects. It is just as likely that business owners will replace workers with ma-
chines. 
conclusion  
When we consider the social meaning of the particular provisions analyzed 
in this Essay, it is not surprising that the distributional consequences of the law 
are regressive. Each of the provisions discussed favors the affluent: traditional 
 
121. See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 113 (2014) 
(arguing that the tax burden on workers is too heavy, compared to the burden on capital hold-
ers). 
122. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2096 (2017) (setting 
the corporate tax rate at 21%, a reduction of between 4-14% depending on a corporation’s 
income in excess of $50,000); id. § 11011 (adding deductions for qualiﬁed business income of 
pass-through entities). 
123. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11061 (increasing the exemption cap for estate and gift tax ex-
emptions—e.g., the basic exclusion amount for estates or gifts made after December 31, 2017 
was increased from $5 million to $10 million). 
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families, capital holders, philanthropists, and businesses. The tax law contrib-
utes to the perpetuation of traditional power structures, so it is imperative that 
scholars uncover its unarticulated biases. If parts of the tax law are borne of prej-
udice and inequality, it is crucial that those values are apparent. People need the 
opportunity to openly object to the codiﬁcation of prejudice in the tax law. Ob-
scuring the implicit messages of the tax law stiﬂes debate. 
In this Essay, I have explored the implicit moral and political message in the 
TCJA. In some examples, it is likely that the TCJA’s social meaning contradicts 
the stated intention of its drafters. In other examples, the Act likely reﬂects the 
unarticulated values of its framers. While I disagree with some of the values ev-
idenced in the TCJA, my project here is not to debate them, but to expose them. 
Policymakers and citizens make a grave error when they treat the tax law as 
amorally technical or dispassionately economic.124 Only by explicitly identifying 
values is it possible to start a discussion about them. Justice in taxation is not 
possible without a full and honest examination of the law’s underlying princi-
ples. 
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124. See Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 
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